Topic: Cutting the CF/DND HQ bloat - Excess CF Sr Leadership, Public Servants and Contractors

[CountDC]

Soldiering, be it infantry, artillery, logistics or what have you, is a young man's game. I can hear alot of people hounding about me about the expiriences and qualifications, etc, etc. Where their is a will, there is a way.

As for the broom sweeping through and cleaning the excess out of Ottawa, you need a bulldog-ish take no garbage leader to do that. Seriously, everybody there will justify their existence as being critical. Apply integrity and decide if your really needed/your section is needed/your HQ is needed/etc.

Not me - as far as I am concerned my position here is not needed as the work I am doing should be divided up and passed to other staff.  The down side of doing that is the others will most likely say they need more staff to do it and result in 2 new positions created.

[dapaterson]

Last week, I saw a news article indicating that DND had at least 5,500 civilian contractors working within the organization and having a government provided desk & phone  … of course, nobody could say for certain exactly how many such contractors existed.  I suspect most (if not all) of those 5,500+ also have an @forces.gc.ca address. 

The estimate was based on counting those labelled as "contractor" in the DND internal email address book.

I suspect a lot of these contractors are working in a very grey area with respect to employer-employee relationships because managers chose contracting to avoid approval hurdles of getting public servants.

Apparently the report from LGen (Retd) Leslie suggested that many of these “contracted employees” could be cut with little political blow-back.  Not only do I think he is right, I suspect we could exploit this reality by making deeper cuts to service contracts and converting the money to SWE.

So, we'll fire all the doctors working on contract and attempt to hire civilian doctors instead?  Except most doctors in private practice incorporate for liability reasons, so we'd be hiring their corporations.  And managing hundreds of contracts.  Instead of one contract as we currently have.

Many contractors are in place as a result of decisions made based on assessment of options.  Certainly, we can revisit all those decisions - and impose greater central control and a reduction of lower-level flexibility.

Contractors are not supposed to speak for the government,  So, as a start point, I propose removing a mechanism that allows the illusion of doing so – no contractor should hold an @forces.gc.ca address (they can work on addresses that function internal to the DWAN only).  Any positions that come-up as absolutely must have external access then raise a flag as probably requiring that posn to be replaced by public service (and since LGen (Retd) Leslie identified many in Ottawa were doing unnecessary work, we can just re-assign one of those positions).

It is incorrect to state LGen Leslie identified anyone doing unnecessary work - he asserted there were many, but never did the detailed analysis to identify what should and should not be done.  His review was glossy and superficial.

In the capital region, this might mean a few less contractors kept around, but in exchange a few more public servants are retained.  In other areas, reassigning money from service contracts to SWE could mean a few hundreds of dollars to pay driver over-time instead of several thousands to contract rental busses with drivers. (This last element might require lowering the level of authority at which a business case allows O&M funds can be converted to SWE for overtime purposes).

So, we do want lower level managers to make a business case and decide?  Or only be able to decide to choose public servants but not contractors?

Two weeks ago, it was reported in another news article that DND would be doing workforce adjustment because the pace of retirements was not going to meet the demand for cuts.  Workforce adjustment is likely to cause frictions with the unions, but we could mitigate those problems by using “contracted employees” (were possible) as fiscal off-sets to reduce the size of PS cuts.

The problems, as seen by LGen (ret'd) Leslie are too many contractors, too many public servants, too many full-time Reservists, and too many non-core activities.

During his tenure as Army Commander, he oversaw a significant growth in Army-employed contractors (look at any Army school); he ovesaw an increase in public servants; he let loose a torrent of full-time Reserve hiring; and launched many initiatives that may not fit in with the core functions of an Army.  In short, he and his peers are the authors of the laundry list of problems he reported on just prior to his retirement.

Andrew Leslie may well have been converted on the road to Damascus.  But his public statements to date have yet to display the slightest humility or acknowledgement of responsbility.


Or, to be more succinct, perhaps I should let Pogo Possum have the last words.  "We have met the enemy, and he is us."

[Anakha]

Quote from posted article:

And if the Transformation staff stepped even farther outside the box, they may identify even more opportunities for cost reductions in infrastructure and training. Take, for example, the Canadian Forces Military Police Academy at CFB Borden, Ont., which has an annual aggregate budget in excess of $3.5 million, which includes the annual operating budget, and civilian and military salaries. This year, the academy expects to graduate 570 students.

There are several institutions throughout Canada that teach policing, including the RCMP’s Depot Division in Regina, Sask., which has been training RCMP constables since 1885. Perhaps a brief discussion between the senior staffs of the RCMP and the Canadian Forces could be fiscally advantageous for both.

Tim Dunne is a Halifax-based military affairs analyst, a Research Fellow with Dalhousie University’s Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and a member of the Royal United Services Institute (NS) Strategic Action Committee.

For someone who specializes in research, Tim Dunne has a lot to learn. CFMPA's budget is nowhere near 3.5 million. The actual operational budget is less than a million (often far, far less). There are only 4 civilian staff members. This is inflationist reporting at best.

Additionally, while some police training aspects remain the same across the board, the RCMP is not set up, experienced, or capable of training MPs on the unique aspects and requirements of military policing.

[dapaterson]

For someone who specializes in research, Tim Dunne has a lot to learn. CFMPA's budget is nowhere near 3.5 million. The actual operational budget is less than a million (often far, far less). There are only 4 civilian staff members. This is inflationist reporting at best.

Additionally, while some police training aspects remain the same across the board, the RCMP is not set up, experienced, or capable of training MPs on the unique aspects and requirements of military policing.

Read the article.  When the Reg F salaries and benefits are considered, the cost of operating the CFMPA is around $3.5M.

As well, if there is only a need for a small military policing add-on to what the RCMP could offer, we could find considerable savings - just as we could find savings by contrcting out our parachute training to the US, just as we could find considerable savings by contracting out EME training to civilian schools and provide only a small military add-on... in short, here are many places we can get training and possibly save money.

But there are other issues that need to be considered as well.  For example:  for initial occupational training, do we get better outcomes from providing an immersive military environment than we would from putting students out on the economy?  Do we want to retain greater surge capability?  Would we  have guarantees of access to the number of course positions we need?

It's never a simple $$$ assessment - rather, things need to be assess holistically.  But we do have to take a realistic view of costs - and Reg F pay is a huge amount of money that needs to be considered when making decisions.

[Anakha]

Read the article.  When the Reg F salaries and benefits are considered, the cost of operating the CFMPA is around $3.5M.

As well, if there is only a need for a small military policing add-on to what the RCMP could offer, we could find considerable savings - just as we could find savings by contrcting out our parachute training to the US, just as we could find considerable savings by contracting out EME training to civilian schools and provide only a small military add-on... in short, here are many places we can get training and possibly save money.

But there are other issues that need to be considered as well.  For example:  for initial occupational training, do we get better outcomes from providing an immersive military environment than we would from putting students out on the economy?  Do we want to retain greater surge capability?  Would we  have guarantees of access to the number of course positions we need?

It's never a simple $$$ assessment - rather, things need to be assess holistically.  But we do have to take a realistic view of costs - and Reg F pay is a huge amount of money that needs to be considered when making decisions.

I understand what you're saying, and I did read the article, but generally when considering a budget within a military unit, Reg F salaries are not included. They don't come out of CFMPA's budget and those salaries would remain the same if the staff were employed at CFMPA or elsewhere. The author is inflating it to suit his topic. The actual operating cost of CFMPA (and therefore potential savings by doing away with it) is relatively extremely small. And I do think that an immersive military environment is important for new MPs. They are not being trained to be civvy cops. The qualification trg goes beyond policing with a small military add-on. It's a military trade with military expectations and the actual trade qualifications (and I think this applies to any military trade, really) should remain in-house. External police trg would not be feasible IMO. Specialty trg is a possibility and several courses are already contracted out to other police services.

[Pusser]

To take it a step further, do we really need the Military Police?

The pre-unification RCN saw no need for a military police force.  Why can't the RCMP, a federal police force, provide domestic police services and criminal investigation while a smaller "provost corps" made up of personnel (drawn from the combat arms) who are trained for the tactical aspects of the MP function serve for a posting or two and then return to their regiments?  For example an infantryman would leave his rifle company for three years, do a tour with the provost company and then go back to a rifle company (with a better understanding of the bigger picture).

[Pusser]

I understand what you're saying, and I did read the article, but generally when considering a budget within a military unit, Reg F salaries are not included.

Not true at all.  Reg Force salaries are often considered (at least in newspaper articles) when citing the cost of running an organization.  Why do you think it supposedly costs $3500/hour to operate a Challenger jet?  What they often fail to mention is what it costs to leave that jet on the ground (probably $3499/hour  ).

Having said that, including Reg Force salaries in the total operating cost could be legitimate in this case.  An argument can be made that closing the school would enable a reduction in the MP establishment (i.e. eliminate the Reg Force MP instructors), which would result in a lower operating cost for the CF as a whole (i.e. paying fewer people).

[dapaterson]

Alterantively, those MP PYs could be repurposed - either strengthen MP dets somewhere, or turn them into some other occupation where we need more capability than we have.

Viewing Reg F pay as a sunk cost is intellectually dishonest, and leads to a misapplication of resources - since they are viewed as "free" we don't necessarily employ them optimally.

[milnews.ca]

Bumped to add link to the report (thought it was elsewhere on the site, but couldn't spot it), as well as links to just-released annexes to said report here, here, here, here, here and here (all HONKING big PDF's)

[fraserdw]

Not me - as far as I am concerned my position here is not needed as the work I am doing should be divided up and passed to other staff.  The down side of doing that is the others will most likely say they need more staff to do it and result in 2 new positions created.

IN the whole history of DND that has never happened.  Since HQ has become bloated the amount of staff work and the sheer volume of ideas has gone up.  Last year we had visits from 4 different NDHQ Majors all in charge of projects to rationalize software use.  All worked for different directors and all demanded the same information be complied but on a different format.  How much does 4 projects to do the same thing cost?  At the same time, they are curtailing training and telling some folks that it will take longer to get promoted because they will not be able to get the courses.

[Jim Seggie]

the sheer volume of ideas has gone up. 

The Good Idea Fairy at work.....sometimes someone needs to smack that fairy upside the head....and off the shoulders of some.

[MCG]

Last year we had visits from 4 different NDHQ Majors all in charge of projects to rationalize software use. 

I wonder if any appreciated the irony that they themselves also needed to be rationalized. 

[Old Sweat]

This story in Embassy Magazine cites a report by the Conference of Defence Associations that opines that there will have to be cuts to CF headquarters outside Ottawa to achieve the levels of savings envisaged. The story is generally well argued until, in the last paragraph, it allows Stephen Staples to demand cuts to the capital programme. The piece is reproduced under the Fair Dealings provision of the Copyright Act.

March, 14, 2012

Defence cuts will be felt outside Ottawa: Analysts

Consolidating North American and overseas command HQs won't go far in achieving the savings the department is said to be hunting for.
By Carl Meyer

Published March 14, 2012   View story  Email Comments To the Editor
           
A new report on cuts to the Canadian Forces argues that if the Harper government is serious about saving money through cutting or reorganizing senior defence department personnel, it won't be able to do it with staff in Ottawa alone.

In a forthcoming study published by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, analyst Dave Perry argues that this was a largely-overlooked conclusion reached by Lt.-Gen. (ret'd) Andrew Leslie and his team in a controversial paper on how to transform the Department of National Defence.

Much of the coverage of the Leslie report focused on its assertion that DND's Ottawa offices had become too bloated with senior staff. But Mr. Perry argues that one file associated with the report, Annex M—which was not attached to the version of the report posted online—demonstrates that any attempt to reorganize regular force, reserve force, and civilian staff in headquarters organizations will require bean counters to look outside Canada's capital for efficiencies.

The military has several of these headquarters offices; some of them are operational and oversee geographic areas, and others focus on the three service branches—the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy, and the Canadian Army. Still others are regional headquarters for larger offices.

The Leslie report counted 18,511 military and civilian staff working for different headquarters organizations within DND. Experts say some of these are very Ottawa-focused.

But in one case, the headquarters of the chief of maritime staff, the annex explicitly shows that staff are scattered in greater numbers across the country. Out of the 1,226 people the annex identified as working for the chief of maritime staff, only 306 work in Ottawa, while 920 work in the Halifax, Victoria, and Quebec City areas.

If the department has looked to free up personnel by reorganizing this headquarters office, said Mr. Perry, it will have needed to address these 920 people.

Mr. Perry acknowledges that the annex doesn't show whether this breakdown is representative of how the other headquarters are structured geographically. But he does point to other evidence that also gives indications of how spread out headquarters staff are.

For example, when the Leslie team calculated which jobs it could reroute to create a new headquarters office as part of its proposed reorganization of DND, it envisioned pulling not only staff in Ottawa, but also thousands of individuals in other headquarters jobs in Kingston, Edmonton, Halifax, Petawawa, Borden, North Bay, and St-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

And while many critics focused on Lt.-Gen. Leslie's suggestion to consolidate the two headquarters in charge of North American and overseas deployments, called Canada Command and Canadian Expeditionary Force Command, the annex shows that 365 and 246 people work for those headquarters, respectively—compared to the land, marine, and air chiefs who oversee over a thousand people each.

In other words, consolidating them wouldn't go very far in achieving the savings the department is reportedly being demanded to find, said Mr. Perry.

He is arguing that all this demonstrates how the department's hands are tied. Assuming that the department is being requested to cut in a big way, as media reports have suggested; that it won't significantly cut spending in other areas, like operations or equipment; and that it wants to free up money and personnel to funnel into new dilemmas like how to integrate all the lessons learned from the combat mission in Afghanistan—the department will need to address non-Ottawa senior staff.

Defence Minister Peter MacKay issued a statement to Embassy in response to questions about the report and the issue of having to cut or reorganize non-Ottawa headquarters personnel.

"This government has made unprecedented investments in the Canadian Forces. Since 2006, the defence budget has grown by more than $6 billion, an average of over $1 billion a year," reads Mr. MacKay's statement.

"However, with the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan and a transition to a more normal operational tempo there is an effect on how the department plans and ultimately allocates its funding. These plans will be communicated following Budget 2012."

Other cuts are being reported as Canada-wide. For example, the Ottawa Citizen suggested March 12 that the Canadian army is expected to lose 697 civilian support jobs. It noted that these cuts would come down not just in Ontario and Quebec, but also the Atlantic area, and the West.

Philippe Lagassé, an assistant professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa who focuses on defence, said he agreed with the fundamental assertion that the department would need to look beyond Ottawa to find cuts.

"I think you need to go outside of Ottawa in terms of just looking at the larger CF footprint across the country. I don't just mean in terms of personnel, I mean in terms of bases, in terms of infrastructure," he said.

"Any serious discussion about trying to maintain the current capital program under the existing budget will require that some money move into that capital budget in a significant fashion. The distribution just doesn't make sense."

But he also pointed out that changing the structure of environmental commands "could really have a good deal of impact on readiness," and in that sense, the department will likely push back on any decision in this regard.

Another observer, Rideau Institute president Steven Staples, said he felt Canada was already overspending on national defence in the first place. "There is certainly a problem with the tooth-to-tail ratio as Leslie pointed out. However, the enormous capital spending cannot be left untouched," he wrote in an email.


cmeyer@embassymag.ca

[Pusser]

I don't think this is particularly well-argued.  It simply focuses on numbers and says nothing about what these HQs are actually doing.  What everybody seems to neglect in these conversations is that reducing the numbers in HQs also reduces the ability of these HQs to perform the staff work necessary in a modern armed force.  Therefore, the staff work is simply downloaded onto the operational units, who don't have time to do it, so it gets neglected.  Before the argument that we do too much unnecessary  staff work pops up, let me just say that the same people screaming for reduced HQs will also be the ones demanding public inquiries into lost money and equipment, which inevitably will be the result of neglected staff work. How many inquiries have been stymied by the lack of proper records, because there was no one available to keep them? 

[dapaterson]

I don't think this is particularly well-argued.  It simply focuses on numbers and says nothing about what these HQs are actually doing.  What everybody seems to neglect in these conversations is that reducing the numbers in HQs also reduces the ability of these HQs to perform the staff work necessary in a modern armed force.  Therefore, the staff work is simply downloaded onto the operational units, who don't have time to do it, so it gets neglected.  Before the argument that we do too much unnecessary  staff work pops up, let me just say that the same people screaming for reduced HQs will also be the ones demanding public inquiries into lost money and equipment, which inevitably will be the result of neglected staff work. How many inquiries have been stymied by the lack of proper records, because there was no one available to keep them?

We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven. 


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect. 

[Teeps74]

We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven. 


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...

[dapaterson]

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

Why is work backlooged?  Because (a) we have managers, not leaders, in key positions, whose timorous bleating prevents delegation of authority and responsibility to lower levels; (b) we have never modernized processes, so we still think a piece of paper is needed for everything, and must have a covering letter (properly formatted) before being sent along - we're stupid enough to print documents, sign the, scan them and send them along, where the next level prints them and repeats the process; (c) no one is empowered to speak truth to power - for example, "CDS, you can't order reservists to attend a function in uniform and simultaneously tell them they are not on duty and not entitled to pay"

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

You owe me a new keyboard.  The dot coms are not operationally effective.  Their staffs are bloated (oh, sorry, "are designed with surge capacity in mind").

Op Athena was a reinforced battalion.  That's it.  No more.  Not a corps in Europe.  We contributed a token sized force to an international operation.  The staff work to support a battalion is not onerous or overly demanding - except we chose to make it so.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

We have plenty of policy.  Nowhere does it say "We need operational HQs in an industrial park, right beside a compressed gas storage facility".  Nowhere does it say "The Army can't do FE for Dom Ops."  Nowhere does it say "General Rick's obsessive Americanism was the right model to adopt".   In fact, we've even got three retired generals who assessed what was done and said, essentially "Um, you might want to rethink this..."

[Teeps74]

The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.

Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.

[dapaterson]

The current model reflects the current policy. That simple. Want to slash? We need a new policy. That simple. We must NOT, however, slash without a proper definition for what is expected of us... We have made THAT particular mistake way too many times.

Once again, in the attack, we do not just simply do a left flanking. We do an estimate, followed by orders, then we pick a method of attack. To just randomly do stuff is statistically suicide.

There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.

[Teeps74]

There was no considered estimate in establishing the dot coms.  There was no considered estimate in "Sure, recruit more infantry".  We are suffering from the after-effects of cult of personality known as Hillierism.

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

[E.R. Campbell]

Actually, the staff work is currently backlogged at all those levels. The nature of the staff work would have to be dramatically changed before you can start the slash and burn, else the paper tiger just eats itself, and everyone scratches their collective heads as to why pay is all screwed up, and no one has bullets. (Yes, I am simplifying things, however, a lot of HQs have already been gutted as a result of spending cuts that have already occurred... These cuts have impacted training to a degree already, and makes it difficult to properly staff IT requirements).

The dot com model is about operational effectiveness. It is NOT about economic effectiveness. We have to choose. Do we want to save five dollars? Or do we want to take that five dollars and add a task? To date, our nation has been very lucky. Picture us running an operation similar to ATHENA, while trying to staff a PSO in Africa AND two natural disasters here on the home front? With the dot com model, this is not an outrageous request, in fact, it is theoretically easily done.

So, I put to you, before any hacking and slashing is done, a defence policy needs to be published. A proper "White Paper", and this policy would have to be followed.

ETA: In the attack model, we do not just jump to a "left flanking" without first doing our combat estimate and issue orders. The left flank might be heavily mined...

From my soft, old, word out seat, far outside the problem I must disagree: I think the best, perhaps the only way, to reform the staff system is to slash and burn, massively, so that commanders and principle staff officers, no matter how weak, must reform or die resign in disgrace.

I do not fear mass resignations (or, better, firings) of GOFOs: I am convinced that half the RCN captains and CA/RCAF colonels are already well prepared to be MGens and, since I believe the CF is, generally, over-ranked by one level in most higher HQs, we can afford a huge exodus of what is, in some (fairly large) measure, deadwood.

BUT: not all the nonsense staff work is the CF's fault. Our, Canadian, political and bureaucratic leadership is also both weak and, worse, inept. Even 20 years ago we were burdened with excess management and measurement by the bureaucratic centre and no one in DND or the CF, not successive MNDs, not any DM after Fowler, and no CDS, as far as I knew, was willing to go to the centre (cabinet, PCO, TB and some agencies) and say "This is BS and we are having none of it and I am ready, willing and, indeed, happy to resign over it." (Only VAdm Chuck Thomas got close, and he resigned, publicly and (briefly ~ because the media isn't interested) loudly over the issue of the CDS refusing to own up to the many and varied problems that faced the CF and, in effect, toeing the government's line even when it was military rubbish. Thomas' beef was with Prince John de Chastelain, not with the Department or the government which, he agreed, was allowed to make silly decisions, absent clear, honest military advice.)

I will not profess to say how we should be organized, except to say that having 20± level 1 (three star (equivalent)) organizations is too rich for an institutions with about 130,000 military (full and part time) and civilian members. I understand that the DM, like all DMs, has a requirement for some very senior civil servants to manage major functions like policy, finance, materiel and human resources and I understand that the CDS can only exercise command through a national HQ (one or two more L1s) and some (maybe only four or five?) subordinate HQs. Surely we can get by with 10-15 L1s, not 20. (And I am suggesting that, no matter what, CSEC survives along with a JAG, a Surgeon General a chief defence scientist and a PR machine ~ but they needn't ALL be at the "top table.")

[E.R. Campbell]

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

Then we should have a single joint staff in Ottawa and some, say four, unified/joint commands scattered across the country into which nearly all RCN, Army and RCAF formations and units fit. Maybe we need professional heads of service (CNS, CGS and CAS) in Ottawa to handle special to service doctrine, training and equipment requirements matters and a Chief of Military Personnel to handle postings and careers and joint career courses and maybe we need a separate, joint Special Operations Organization, but I am convinced that we you the CF can do more, better and faster, with a lot less than they have now.

[Loachman]

The dot coms are a result of the insular nature of the branches.  The former CDS recognized the necessity for the Army, Navy and Air Force to work together from time to time, and that their efforts could not be realistically managed as insular institutions.  These difficulties have been popping up for decades, despite the best efforts of Unification.

The joint nature of today's operations has to continue to be addressed, and Canada COM and CEFCOM do exactly this. Can they do it better? Sure... We can all do stuff better. I feel strongly that the CF must continue to grow in a joint model, failure to do so will just lead to failure. When all the bugs are worked out (remember, the dot coms are just 6 years old...), we will see the possibility of operational effectiveness and some economic effectiveness.

I completely disagree.

I have yet to see any positive effect from the establishment of the dot.coms.

The only effects that I have seen are confusion and delay and self-justifying busy-work.

I spent eight years as the Helicopter Booking Guy at LFCA HQ, as a Class A Reservist. I turned down several offers of Class B, as there wasn't enough work to justify that. As a result of the establishment of the dot.coms, I was replaced by a full-time LCol, full-time Maj, full-time Capt, part-time Capt, full-time WO, and a handful of 2Lt OJT guys.

The Land Force Area system was established largely to handle domestic ops. It replaced the earlier regional system, wherein the six regions were commanded by the biggest HQ located within their boundaries. It was recognized that the Army should take the lead for all land-based domestic ops, supported by the other two environmental commands as required. The other two environmental commands were responsible for their traditional roles - air defence and SAR and maritime ops. I saw no logical reason to change it.

I never saw any indication of a lack of willingness for one environmental command to support another as appropriate. My first time working at LFCA was during the Ice Storm, and we had Air Command pushing far more airframes at us, of all varieties, than we could employ.

[Pusser]

We do excess staff work for the sake of doing excess staff work.  The op order for D-Day was 22 pages; that would not even cover of the envrionmental annex to most modern ops orders.  I believe it's Storr who observed that "modern" staff systems resulted in the UK op order for the attack on Bagdad being issued roughly 24 hours after the city had fallen.  Our staff processes (administrative or operational) are sub-optimal and largely process driven. 


I'll pick on the Army's headquarters bloat.  For 20K Regular and 20K reserves, we have:

Four geographically-based HQs, three of which are double-hatted as regional commands for dom ops.  (Unity of command is apparently passé)

Three Reg F Bde HQs

Ten Res F Bde HQs

Four Area support group HQs

One training command HQ

One subordinate training formation HQ

One higher formation HQ (1 Can Div) with a small number of enablers attached, but no combat power.


If we were to assume only 50 pers per HQ, that's 1200 FTEs tied up - of which only the CMBG HQs and 1 Can Div are notionally deployable.  And some are larger than 50 pers, meaning the total personnel bill is even higher.

There are economies to be found there.  There is staff work that can be eliminated to no ill effect.

No arguments here.  However, the problem we often see with the hack and slash approach to savings is a complete lack of thought or rationalization.  I have often seen staff processes eliminated because one party thought they were useless, but never bothered to consult with other parties that in fact, needed them.  CFSS Upgrade is a prime example.  Sure, the system needed upgrading and replacement, but what we got in return was a far less effective system for which we are still paying the cost.

I'm all for finding efficiencies and eliminating unnecessary processes, but  we need to put more thought into it than "look at all the people we've got in HQs.  They're obviously top heavy."  Some offices are indeed overstaffed (I've been in one), but others are grossly understaffed.  We first need to rationalize the processes, then we can look at the numbers and adjust accordingly. 

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...

[GAP]

We also need to be willing to slaughter a few sacred cows...and empire builders...